DESCRIPCIÓN DE LA ASIGNATURA

Grado/Máster en:	Graduado/a en Economía por la Universidad de Málaga
Centro:	Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Asignatura:	Economía del Bienestar
Código:	403
Tipo:	Optativa
Materia:	Economia
Módulo:	Optativas
Experimentalidad:	80 % teórica y 20 % práctica
Idioma en el que se imparte:	Inglés
Curso:	4
Semestre:	2
Nº Créditos:	6
Nº Horas de dedicación del	150
Tamaño del Grupo Grande:	72
Tamaño del Grupo Reducido:	30
Página web de la asignatura:	

EQUIPO DOCENTE

Departamento: TEORÍA E HISTORIA ECONÓMICA
Área: FUNDAMENTOS DEL ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO

Nombre y Apellidos	Mail	Teléfono Laboral	Despacho	Horario Tutorías
Coordinador/a: PABLO AMOROS GONZALEZ	pag@uma.es	952131245	3407 - FAC. DE ECONÓMICAS	Todo el curso: Miércoles 09:30 - 12:00, Jueves 10:00 - 13:30
M. SOCORRO PUY SEGURA	mps@uma.es	952131252	3402 - FAC. DE ECONÓMICAS	Todo el curso: Lunes 10:15 - 14:15, Martes 12:00 - 14:00

RECOMENDACIONES Y ORIENTACIONES

1. Attend class.
2. Read the recommended bibliography and notes to each item that will be hanging in the virtual campus.
3. Take notes and review them before each class.
4. Develop the practical exercises.
5. Discuss with peers the issues and more difficult practical questions of the matter.
6. Volunteer to solve in class the practical exercises.

CONTEXTO

The program content is divided into three sections: Social Choice Theory, Mechanism Design and Allocation of Indivisible Goods (Matching). The first block is divided into three parts: Voting Rules, Social Choice Functions and Political Institutions. The second block is divided into three parts: Key Implementation Strategies, The Principle of Revelation, and Implementation in Nash Equilibria. The third block studies matching models and school choice.
The Welfare Economics program aims to familiarize students with the basic ideas and concepts of the theory of social choice and mechanism design. Previous to the Welfare Economics course, students have to study five subjects related to Microeconomics: Introduction to Economics (first year) , Microeconomics (first year), Game Theory (second year), Intermediate Microeconomics (second year) and Advanced Microeconomics (third year) .

COMPETENCIAS

3 Competencias específicas. Competencias especificas de los módulos y materias

Competencias especificas

25 Competencias especificas de la materia de Economia del modulo de Optativas

3.25.18 Capacidad para la construcción, resolución e interpretación de modelos económicos a partir de supuestos alternativos

3.25.19 Conocer y entender las limitaciones de los modelos micro y macroeconómicos estándares

3.25.20 Capacidad para analizar los modelos económicos básicos usando supuestos psicológicos

3.25.21 Capacidad para relacionar las implicaciones de los modelos económicos y las hipótesis

3.25.23 Capacidad para entender y aplicar la Teoría Microeconómica al planteamiento y resolución de las cuestiones más relevantes del Sector Público.

3.25.26 Capacidad para interpretar correctamente los resultados más relevantes de la Economía del Bienestar: Teoremas del Bienestar, Teorema de Imposibilidad de Arrow, Teorema del votante mediano, Teorema de Gibbard-Satterwhite.

3.25.2 Capacidad para comparar los distintos sistemas de votación para la elección de candidatos y de alternativas.
7

CONTENIDOS DE LA ASIGNATURA

Part I: The Theory of Social Decisions

Unit 1. Voting Rules
Theme 1. Voting Rules
- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.2. Modeling the context
- 1.2. Modeling the context
- 1.3 Describing different voting rules
- 1.3 Describing different voting rules
- 1.4 On the classification of voting rules
- 1.4 On the classification of voting rules
- 1.5 How to choose a voting rule
- 1.5 How to choose a voting rule
- 1.6 Conclusion
- 1.6 Conclusion

Theme 2. Social Preferences
Unit 2. Social Preferences
- 2.1. Introduction
- 2.1. Introduction
- 2.2 Modeling the context
- 2.2 Modeling the context
- 2.3 Desirable criteria for a social election function
- 2.3 Desirable criteria for a social election function
- 2.4 Arrow Theorem
- 2.4 Arrow Theorem
- 2.5 On the manipulation of voting rules
- 2.5 On the manipulation of voting rules

Unit 3. Studying Political Institutions
Theme 3. Studying Political Institutions
- 3.1. Direct democracy versus representative democracy
- 3.1. Direct democracy versus representative democracy
- 3.2. Representative democracy: Plurality rule
- 3.2. Representative democracy: Plurality rule
- 3.3. Representative democracy: Proportional representation
- 3.3. Representative democracy: Proportional representation
- 3.4 The Spanish political system
- 3.4 The Spanish political system

Part II: Mechanism Design

Theme 1. The Problem of Mechanism Design
Unit 1. The Problem of Mechanism Design
- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.2. Examples
- 1.2. Examples
- 1.3 A General Mechanism Design Setting
- 1.3 A General Mechanism Design Setting

Theme 2. Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
Unit 2. Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design
- 2.1. Dominant Strategies
- 2.1. Dominant Strategies
- 2.2 Direct Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle
- 2.2 Direct Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle
- 2.3 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- 2.3 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- 2.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and Other Domains
- 2.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and Other Domains

Unit 3. Nash Equilibrium Mechanism Design
Theme 3. Nash Equilibrium Mechanism Design
- 3.1. Nash equilibrium
- 3.1. Nash equilibrium
- 3.2. Maskin Monotonicity and No Veto Power
- 3.2. Maskin Monotonicity and No Veto Power
- 3.3. The Canonical Mechanism for Nash Implementation
- 3.3. The Canonical Mechanism for Nash Implementation

Theme 4. Applications
Unit 4. Applications
- 4.1 Implementation under Adverse Selection
- 4.1 Implementation under Adverse Selection
- 4.2 Eliciting the True Ranking
- 4.2 Eliciting the True Ranking

Part III: Allocation of indivisible goods

Unit 1. The marriage model.
- 1.1. One-to-one matching model.
- 1.2. Stability.
- 1.3. The deferred acceptance mechanism.
- 1.4. Manipulating stable matching mechanisms.

Unit 2. The college admission problem.
- 1.1. One-to-many matching model.
- 1.2. College preferences and stability.
- 1.3. Manipulating stable matching mechanisms.

Unit 3. The school choice problem.
- 1.1. Introduction.
- 1.2. Stability and efficiency.
- 1.3. The student optimal stable and the Boston mechanisms.

ACTIVIDADES FORMATIVAS

Actividades presenciales

Actividades expositivas

Lección magistral

Actividades prácticas en aula docente

Otras actividades prácticas

ACTIVIDADES DE EVALUACIÓN

RESULTADOS DE APRENDIZAJE / CRITERIOS DE EVALUACIÓN

1. To familiarize students with models of social choice and mechanism design.
2. Gain insights into the strategic behavior of individuals.
3. To familiarize students with the processes of collective decision-making.
4. Learn what processes of rational collective decision making are implementable and under what circumstances.
5. Gain insights into situations where it is appropriate to apply majority voting.
6. Identify and anticipate relevant economic issues relating to the allocation of resources in general, both in private and in public
7. Bring rationality to the analysis and description of any aspect of economic reality.
8. Understanding economic institutions as a result and application of theoretical or formal representations of how the economy works.
9. Read and communicate in the professional field in more than one language, especially English.
10. Communicate fluently in an environment and teamwork.
11. Capacity for analysis and synthesis.

PROCEDIMIENTO DE EVALUACIÓN

1. Final Exam.

Criteria: Assess mastery of the theoretical and practical concepts. Solving exercises
Skills Evaluated: All
Weighting (% of final grade): 80% Recoverable Activity: Yes

2. Public exposition of a research paper or resolution of individual class exercices.

Criteria: Resolution and presentation on the board of the practical exercises Skills Evaluated: All
Weighting (% of final grade): 10% Recoverable Activity: No

As for non-recoverable activities for the second ordinary session (September call) and the extraordinary call of the next academic year, the grade obtained for the first ordinary session will remain.
Also in regard to part-time student, it will be as provided in the rules of the UMA. In this sense, the right to recognition of a system of flexible attendance character that does not adversely affect the process of evaluation of the student will apply.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA Y OTROS RECURSOS

Básica

Mas-Colell, Whisnton y Green, 1995, ¿Microeconomic Theory¿, Osford University Press.

Complementaria

Al Roth, Marilda Sotomayor, Two-sided Matching (1990), Cambridge University Press

David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey S. Banks, Positive Political Theory I (2000), Michigan University Press.

David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey S. Banks, Positive Political Theory I (2000), Michigan University Press.

Hervé Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making (1988), Cambridge University Press.

Luis C. Corchón, The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics (1996), Ed. Macmillan Press Ltd.

W. Thomson, Manipulation and Implementation in Economics (1986), Universidad de Rochester.

DISTRIBUCIÓN DEL TRABAJO DEL ESTUDIANTE

ACTIVIDAD FORMATIVA PRESENCIAL

Descripción	Horas	Grupo grande	Grupos reducidos

Descripción	Horas	Grupo grande	Grupos reducidos
Lección magistral	36	☐	☐
Otras actividades prácticas	9	☐	☐
TOTAL HORAS ACTIVIDAD FORMATIVA PRESENCIAL	**45**		

ACTIVIDAD FORMATIVA NO PRESENCIAL

Descripción	Horas
TOTAL HORAS ACTIVIDAD FORMATIVA NO PRESENCIAL	**90**
TOTAL HORAS ACTIVIDAD EVALUACIÓN	**15**
TOTAL HORAS DE TRABAJO DEL ESTUDIANTE	**150**